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Abstract: What are the underlying rationales for industrial policy? Does 
empirical evidence support the use of industrial policy for correcting market failures that 
plague the process of industrialization? To address these questions, we provide a critical 
survey of the analytical literature on industrial policy. We also review some recent 
industry successes and argue that only a limited role was played by public interventions. 
Moreover, the recent ascendance of international industrial networks, which dominate the 
sectors in which least developed countries have in the past had considerable success, 
implies a further limitation on the potential role of industrial policies as traditionally 
understood. Overall, there appears to be little empirical support for an activist 
government policy even though market failures exist that can, in principle, justify the use 
of industrial policy.  
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Many nations in recent years have encountered great disappointment with the 
results of pursuing conventional economic policies that Williamson crystallized and 
named the Washington Consensus. Although few countries ever followed the pristine 
form of this consensus, some countries in East Asia adhered to many (but hardly all) of 
its components and experienced extraordinarily rapid growth for a period of three 
decades or more. Though there was a brief and sharp recession in some of these countries 
during the crisis of 1997 to 1999, most have rebounded with the exception of Indonesia. 
Yet other nations that have gotten their macroeconomic and trade regimes much closer to 
the idealized consensus than the Asian countries did have failed to experience 
comparable growth. In many Latin American nations and in some African ones as well, 
there is an understandable search for the magic bullet and many policy makers have 
expressed interest in some form or other of industrial policy. 
Few phrases elicit such strong reactions from economists and policy-makers as 
industrial policy. As Evenett (2003) notes, the term ‘industrial policy’ means different 
things to different people. According to us, industrial policy is basically any type of 
selective intervention or government policy that attempts to alter the sectoral structure of 
production toward sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth 
than would occur in the absence of such intervention, i.e., in the market equilibrium. 
Policies designed to improve the productivity of individual sectors and firms are a 
subsidiary but often pursued objective. Given this definition, it is not surprising that those 
who believe strongly in the efficient working of markets view any argument in favor of 
industrial policy as fiction or, worse, an invitation for all types of rent seeking activities. 
On the other side, people who believe market failures are pervasive think that any path to 
economic development requires a liberal dose of industrial policy.  
In this paper, we address arguments for and against industrial policy and then ask 
whether empirical evidence helps settle the debate in favor of one group or another. As is 
often the case, evidence does not come out strongly in favor of one group. While there 
certainly exist cases where government intervention co-exists with successes, in many 
instances industrial policy has failed to yield any gains. Above all, the real issue is that   3
the relevant counterfactuals are not available. Consider the argument that Japan’s 
industrial policy was crucial for its success. Since we do not know how Japan would have 
fared under laissez-faire, it is difficult to attribute its success to its industrial policy. 
Maybe it would have done still better in the absence of industrial policy or maybe it 
would have done much worse. Given this basic difficulty, we can only hope to obtain 
indirect clues regarding the efficacy of industrial policy. Direct evidence that can `hold 
constant’ all of the required variables (as would be done in a well specified econometric 
exercise) simply does not exist and it is unlikely that it will ever exist – perhaps that is 
why the debate over industrial policy has remained unsettled and may remain so in the 
future. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we critically analyze the major 
conceptual arguments in favor of industrial policy. Since the infant industry argument for 
trade protection anticipates most of the rationales for industrial policy, we begin with a 
discussion of this argument. Then, in section 3, we examine how the case of India’s 
successful software industry fits into the arguments for industrial policy. In section 4, we 
ask how the expansion of international production networks has altered the case for 
industrial policy. In section 5, we provide some concluding remarks where we also 
comment on the issue of ‘policy space.’ 
2. Why industrial policy?  
In this section, we present a detailed discussion of the various theoretical 
arguments in favor of industrial policy. At a general level, there is room for government 
intervention either when markets are characterized by some distortions (such as 
externalities or presence of market power) or because they are incomplete (for example 
futures markets for many goods simply do not exist). As is known from one of the basic 
theorems of welfare economics, under such market failures, a competitive market system 
does not yield the socially efficient outcome. In the end, any argument for industrial 
policy is a special case of this general argument.  
Three arguments in favor of industrial policy have received the most attention. 
The first is derived from the presence of knowledge spillovers and dynamic scale 
economies; the second stems from the presence of coordination failures while the third 
concerns informational externalities. Before discussing these arguments in detail, it is   4
useful to begin with a rather well known argument for trade protection that is in many 
ways the precursor for modern arguments for industrial policy. In fact, as will become 
clear shortly, at least two of the aforementioned arguments for industrial policy play an 
important role in the infant industry argument for trade protection. 
A.  The infant industry argument: a precursor of modern industrial policy 
The infant industry argument is one of the oldest arguments for trade protection 
and is perhaps the only such argument that is not dismissed out of hand by trade 
economists. The most popular (and the simplest) version of the argument runs as follows. 
Production costs for newly established domestic industries in a country may be initially 
higher than those of well-established foreign competitors due to their greater experience. 
However, over time, new domestic producers can experience cost reductions due to 
learning by doing (i.e. they enjoy dynamic scale economies) and can end up attaining the 
production efficiency of their foreign rivals. However, due to the initial absence  of 
experience, if domestic industry is not protected from foreign competition, it will never 
take off and if dynamic scale economies are strong enough, temporary protection of the 
domestic industry can be in the national interest.  
A stronger version of the argument states that the domestic industry might even 
be capable of attaining production costs below its foreign rivals if it is given sufficient 
protection. In this version of the argument, true comparative advantage lies with the 
domestic industry so that temporary protection may actually be in the global interest – 
consumers in the rest of the world can also benefit from the eventual lower production 
cost of the domestic industry.  In an influential paper, Baldwin (1969) provided an 
incisive criticism of the infant industry argument. He argued that “if after the learning 
period, unit costs in an industry are sufficiently lower than those during its early 
production stages to yield a discounted surplus of revenues over costs (and therefore 
indicate a comparative advantage for the country in the particular line), it would be 
possible for firms in the industry to raise sufficient funds in the capital market to cover 
their initial excess of outlays over receipts.”  
In other words, as Baldwin points out, the period of learning during which 
domestic firms are unprofitable can be treated as an initial fixed cost that can be 
recovered once the industry is globally competitive. If future returns indeed outweigh   5
initial losses, capital markets would finance the necessary investment needed by the 
domestic industry. It is obvious, but worth stressing, that if future returns fall short of 
initial losses, the industry should not be established in the first place. A frequently cited 
counter to Baldwin’s criticism (and one that he acknowledged) is that capital markets 
might be imperfect and therefore the industry may fail to gain the required financing. For 
example, a proponent might appeal to the presence of informational asymmetries: unlike 
producers, investors may not know that the industry is profitable in the long run and 
therefore fail to provide the capital needed to cover the initial costs. However, such an 
argument defies credibility since it requires one to believe that firms that have not even 
begun to produce the good in question know more about their prospects than those whose 
main objective is to find profitable uses for their excess capital and have analyzed and 
financed similar projects. Even if one grants the presence of asymmetric information, 
why cannot potential producers convey such information to likely investors?  
While the infant industry argument assumes that it is known with certainty that 
the industry in question will eventually be profitable, it seems more likely that the 
prospects for most new industries are uncertain and no one really knows whether or not a 
particular infant industry will in fact be profitable in the future. Under such 
circumstances, capital markets would require compensation for the risks involved and the 
interest rates required might make the investment unprofitable. But efficiency requires 
that those bearing risks should be compensated and there is no market failure if the 
underlying problem is that investors do not provide the necessary capital because they 
perceive the rewards to be not commensurate with the risks they are asked to bear.  
Nevertheless, the assumption of omniscient financial intermediaries should be 
viewed with some degree of skepticism. From early bubbles such as the Tulip mania to 
the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s it is clear that financial actors are often deficient. In the 
case of countries that suppressed the financial sector and directed industry and firm 
specific loans as a part of industrial policy, the banking sector was itself in need of 
significant improvement in operating procedures much as industrial firms were. Thus, the 
argument that if there were opportunities they would be exploited by investors might be a 
weak link in Baldwin’s argument. On the other hand, it also implies that any selective 
economic policies would have to simultaneously address the weakness of this sector   6
along with that of manufacturing or other services. Indeed there might be an argument for 
initially strengthening the banking sector, perhaps by allowing foreign financial 
intermediaries into the country, before pursuing targeted sectoral policies. In any case, as 
Baldwin notes, if there indeed is a problem with capital markets, policy ought to target 
that specific problem as opposed to providing trade protection for an industry that is 
claiming to be profitable but cannot convince investors that such is the case. In today’s 
world of global capital markets, the simple version of the infant industry argument runs 
into a real difficulty – since there are foreign producers that have achieved low 
production costs due to their head start, investors can determine the prospects for the 
domestic infant industry from the experience of existing foreign producers. If domestic 
investors lack such information, surely foreign investors ought to have it. Why cannot the 
borrowing be international rather than local? A potential answer to this question is that 
investors may believe that just because an industry has succeeded abroad does not 
necessarily imply that it will also succeed at home. But this explanation can be consistent 
with the very hypotheses underlying the infant industry argument only if investors are not 
fully rational. This point is related to the idea that a country may not really know where 
its comparative advantage lies and we discuss this in greater detail in section 2D. 
What light has formal analysis shed on the simple infant industry argument? A 
seminal paper by Bardhan (1971) noted that the infant industry argument is dynamic in 
nature and that “any elaboration of this idea involves explicitly dynamic analysis, and it 
has hardly been integrated into the main corpus of trade theory which is mostly 
comparative-static in nature.” Bardhan (1971) provided the first dynamic model of 
learning by doing in an open economy and derived the optimum extent and time path of 
protection to the learning industry. In his model, there are two goods c and m and two 
factors of production capital and labor with constant returns to scale in production of both 
goods. The learning effect is assumed to depend upon the cumulated volume of industry 
output in good m and it shifts out the production function for the good in a Hicks neutral 
fashion.
1 Bardhan models learning by doing as a classic positive externality that depends 
                                                 
1 Bardhan’s model is in the spirit of the original learning-by-doing model of Arrow which posited learning 
that occurred in the machine producing sector. Some of the endogenous growth literature also posits such 
effects. However, much of the literature on technological innovation summarized in Evenson and Westphal   7
upon the size of the learning industry: the higher the cumulative output of the industry, 
the more productive the technology of each individual firm. When learning is unbounded, 
Bardhan shows that it is socially optimal to subsidize the infant industry and that the time 
profile of the optimal subsidy depends upon initial conditions – when the initial stock of 
experience is relatively small, the optimal subsidy decreases over time to a stationary rate 
otherwise it increases over time. However, the infant industry argument is predicated on 
the idea that the learning effect is temporary. To allow for this, Bardhan also considers 
optimal policy under the scenario where the learning effect is present only until 
cumulated industry output falls below a certain threshold. Under such bounded learning, 
the optimal subsidy is positive only till the threshold level of cumulative output is 
reached after which zero subsidy is optimal. Finally, Bardhan also considers the case 
where the foreign industry is also subject to learning and the domestic industry enjoys 
spillovers from foreign learning and shows that it might still be optimal to subsidize the 
domestic infant industry. However, his framework does not capture the idea that 
international spillovers may partially substitute for domestic learning since the learning 
effect function contains the stock of domestic and foreign outputs as separate arguments 
and the relationship between the two is not really considered.
2  
Succar (1987) extends Bardhan’s (1971) analysis to allow the learning in one 
sector to generate spillovers for both sectors thereby providing an inter-industry spillover 
rationale for the infant industry argument. As might be expected, the optimal path of 
output subsidy in the presence of both intra and inter-industry learning by doing (LBD) 
economies lies above that when only the former are present. However, the presence of 
such economies is not sufficient to justify intervention. As Succar astutely notes, the 
discounted stream of productivity gains generated by LBD in the infant industry should 
outweigh the discounted stream of subsidies or else intervention would be socially 
undesirable.
3 Furthermore, like Bardhan, Succar assumes that industry learning and firm 
learning are one and the same. Such need not be the case and firms may learn more from 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995) and Ruttan (2002) shows that learning can occur in all sectors, a fact that would enormously 
complicate the results of much of the literature. 
2 Pack and Saggi (2001) explore the implications of the provision of free technology by the purchasers of a 
firm’s exports, a further complication.   8
their own experience relative to that of other firms. Of course, is this is true then models 
of perfect competition would have to be abandoned – once a firm realizes that its own 
output lowers its future costs, price taking behavior cannot be assumed since the firm 
would never be in equilibrium. But it is worth noting that the presence of imperfect 
competition does not necessarily weaken the argument for infant industry intervention – 
firms with market power typically produce too little output and an even larger subsidy 
may be called for to correct the underproduction problem.  
According to Succar (1987), the presence of inter-industry LBD economies 
considerably strengthens the case for intervention in favor of infant industries and there 
can be an irreversible locational advantage in producing goods characterized by such 
LBD economies domestically. The intuitive idea underlying Succar’s model is that the 
production of capital goods can enhance growth by acting as an “informal learning center 
where technical skills are required” thereby contributing to a country’s technical 
infrastructure.
4 Such improvements in the skill base of workers complement investments 
in human capital and can help further the industrialization process in developing 
countries.  
The distinction between firm and industry level LBD becomes quite important 
when one considers the fact that firms are heterogeneous in nature. Suppose some firms 
are more efficient at learning than others. Under such a scenario, optimal subsidies would 
necessarily have to be non-uniform and the government is unlikely to possess the 
information needed to implement an optimal subsidy program. Given the information 
problem, it might make sense for the government to adopt a uniform policy even though 
it may not be first best. While in theory one can design mechanisms that result in firms 
revealing their learning capabilities but the practical relevance of such mechanisms is far 
from clear. 
As one might expect, there is more to the infant industry argument than the 
‘simple version’ formalized by Bardhan (1971) and Succar (1987). As Baldwin notes, 
there are four versions of the infant industry argument that are a bit more nuanced: (a) 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 It is likely that this criterion has been satisfied by the European Airbus effort, widely considered a major 
example of a successful industrial policy. However, one also needs to account for the cost of distortions 
that are generated by the taxes needed to finance the subsidies paid.   9
acquisition of knowledge involves costs but yet knowledge may not be appropriable by 
an individual firm (i.e. knowledge spillovers may discourage investment in acquisition of 
knowledge) - this is the standard argument for subsidizing R&D; (b) firms may provide 
costly on the job training but may not be able to prevent the diffusion of such knowledge 
via movement of workers (i.e. there might be a free-rider problem in worker training)  - 
while firm specific training involves no potential externality, general training can lead to 
externalities that would justify subsidies; (c) static positive externalities in the production 
of a good may justify trade protection and (d) determining profitability of a new industry 
might require a costly investment the results of which may become freely available to 
potential competitors – in other words, investment into new industries might result in 
informational externalities that make it difficult for investors to earn a rate of return that 
is high enough for the initial investment to be justified. This is precisely the argument 
that has been formalized by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) although they call it the 
process of ‘self-discovery’ – i.e. the process of determining what you can produce 
profitably at world prices. 
The simple version of the infant industry argument does not really specify how 
learning occurs – i.e. it just assumes that dynamic scale economies somehow will be 
realized by the infant industry. Of course, learning is rarely exogenous and it usually 
requires considerable effort and investment on the part of firms (Pack and Westphal, 
1986). If such investments are to be made, firms need to be able to appropriate the 
benefits of the knowledge gained. As is well known, knowledge is a non-rival good and, 
once created, any number of agents can use it simultaneously. If firms cannot prevent the 
leakage of knowledge that is costly to create, then they will have little incentive to create 
such knowledge in the first place. In other words, property rights over knowledge may 
not be enforceable and this can create a rationale for government intervention (this is one 
reason why we have intellectual property rights protection).  
As Baldwin notes (1969), many types of knowledge acquisition are not subject to 
the externality described above since entrepreneurs can often prevent the leakage of their 
knowledge to potential competitors. Similarly, if there are only a few firms in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Succar’s emphasis on the capital goods sector is similar in spirit to Arrow’s learning by doing model and 
endogenous growth models such as Romer’s (1986) model  that employed it as a building block.   10
industry, inter-firm negotiations should help offset the externality problem (see Coase, 
1960). But what if many rival firms benefit from the investment undertaken by a 
knowledge acquiring firm and nothing can be done to prevent such diffusion? Is 
government intervention justified then? As is clear, trade protection is certainly not called 
for – a tariff does nothing to solve the basic externality problem. In fact, trade protection 
may very well worsen the problem. As Baldwin (1969) notes: “…the speed at which 
firms respond to market opportunities is a function of the level of profit prospects. A duty 
will make it worthwhile for firms to incur the costs of acquiring the knowledge 
discovered by other firms (if it is not completely free) faster (italics added) and also to 
move into production more rapidly…” A production subsidy to the entire sector will also 
fail to remedy the externality. What is needed are subsidies to initial entrants into the 
industry that help create new knowledge and discover better production technologies. As 
in the case of R&D subsides, governments should target the marginal rather than 
inframarginal research. In the case of new firms, it takes time to discover whether a new 
idea or technology is socially valuable and the adoption of a novel technology by others 
is in fact the strongest proof of its social value. Thus, such a policy of rewarding early 
entrants requires an accurate forecast of the social value of their inventions and 
discoveries – a process that can be fraught with failure. Not only that, given the 
uncertainty associated with new technologies, a delayed pattern of adoption might even 
be socially optimal. 
B.  Knowledge spillovers, dynamic scale economies, and industrial targeting  
One of the most powerful ideas in all of economics is the notion of comparative 
advantage. Ever since David Ricardo, it has been well known that under free trade a 
country can increase its national income (and welfare) by moving resources into sectors 
in which its opportunity cost of production is lower than its trading partners. But is this 
prescription sufficient to generate economic growth? Perhaps not. Allocating resources 
according to comparative advantage can only ensure static efficiency and in no way 
guarantees dynamic efficiency. Succar (1987) argues “…the comparative advantage 
theory is a static construct that ignores forward linkages exist between present choices 
and future production possibilities. Therefore it cannot guide the pattern of international 
specialization when there are asymmetric learning opportunities associated with the   11
production of different goods and/or use of certain techniques. Promotion of industries 
which generate substantial learning by doing economies should be an integral part of a 
strategy of human capital formation in LDCs.” In other words, Succar argues for some 
sort of industrial targeting although her model does not explicitly deal with this issue. 
 Even if one accepts the premise that certain industries are more likely to generate 
spillovers (based on knowledge diffusion or other factors), can policy be designed to 
encourage the ‘right’ industries? The ideal but rarely attained goal of industrial policy is 
the development of a general-purpose technology.  DARPA, a small unit within the U.S. 
Department of Defense that generated and financed a portfolio of projects, is widely 
credited with having been the key contributor to the development of the internet, the 
demand for this innovation being derived from the need to maintain communications 
during an assault on the U.S.  This breakthrough was clearly fundamental and has social 
benefits many-fold the cost of the DARPA effort. This instance of success addressed a 
market failure, namely, the social benefits of research were much larger than the 
anticipated private benefits. Moreover, DARPA foresaw a potential need that may have 
escaped the purview of private firms. While the internet was a major technological 
breakthrough and suggests the potential gains from such an activity, it is useful to 
remember that, by their very nature, the discovery of such “general purpose technologies” 
is a rare event.  
The informational constraints facing policy-makers pursuing industrial policy are 
severe and any realistic model of industrial targeting needs to account for them. In a 
recent paper, Klimenko (2004) models industrial targeting as an optimal experimentation 
strategy of a government that lacks information about the set of industries in which the 
economy has comparative advantage with respect to rest of the world. He examines the 
set of industries in which a country will specialize as a result of such policy. In his model, 
for any set of targeted industries, it is possible to know whether or not a country will 
specialize in this set with positive or zero probability. He shows that an optimally 
designed industrial policy can actually lead a country to specialize in sectors in which it 
does not have comparative advantage. The key issue is the beliefs of the policymaker. 
Depending on the nature of such beliefs, a country can end up abandoning the industries 
in which it has “true” comparative advantage.   12
Furthermore, Klimenko argues that the policy-maker may stop looking for better 
targets when the favored industries perform well enough. He interprets this outcome as a 
failure of industrial targeting policy even though it may not appear as such. In fact, he 
goes on to show that, despite the existence of market failures, the outcome of the learning 
process through private experimentation (without any assistance from the government) 
can even yield outcomes that are closer to the full information social optimum. 
Klimenko’s rigorous analysis of this issue underscores our intuitive argument that the 
relevant counterfactuals are unavailable and what may appear to be a successful industrial 
policy may not be the first best outcome from a country’s perspective – merely doing 
something well need not imply one cannot be better at something else. 
While Klimenko’s model considers the case where the government does not have 
information about the industries in which the country has comparative advantage, 
Dinopoulos et. al. (1995) examine industrial targeting when the government lacks 
information about the local industry’s learning curve and provide a framework that 
synthesizes industrial targeting with learning by doing of the type analyzed by Bardhan 
(1971) and Succar (1987). More specifically, in their model a domestic monopolist faces 
a competitive foreign fringe that has exhausted all learning economies. While the current 
production cost of the domestic firm is assumed to exceed that of the foreign fringe, the 
future relative cost of the domestic firm can be lower if its learning curve is steep enough.  
They show that under such circumstances, the optimal local policy is a subsidy to the 
domestic firm that increases with the amount by which the domestic firm’s price, post-
learning, falls below the cost of the foreign industry. An intriguing finding of the model 
is that the optimal policy provides a subsidy to the domestic firm precisely when it would 
learn a sufficient amount to actually drive the foreign fringe from the domestic market – 
under such a scenario, despite the fact that a domestic monopoly results, the price in the 
domestic market is below the competitive price set by the foreign industry. The idea is 
that a monopolist is preferable to a competitive industry if its price falls below that of the 
competitive industry’s cost (price). But there is a difficulty with this argument -- given 
the option of exporting, why is the price lower in the domestic market? 
C.  Coordination failures as a rationale for industrial policy 
The basic idea behind the coordination failure argument for industrial policy is   13
that many projects require simultaneous investments in order to be viable and if these 
investments are made by independent agents there is little guarantee that, acting in their 
own self interest, each agent would choose to invest. As Scitovsky (1954) noted, 
reciprocal pecuniary externalities in the presence of increasing returns can lead to market 
failure because the coordination of investment decisions requires a signaling device to 
transmit information about present plans and future conditions and the pricing system is 
not capable of playing this role.  
Pack and Westphal (1986) argue that such pecuniary externalities related to 
investments in technology are pervasive in industrialization. They provide an example of 
two infant industries (say A and B) where industry A produces an intermediate that is 
required in industry B and neither industry is profitable if it is established alone. 
However, if both industries are established together, then both are profitable implying 
that it is socially optimal to indeed establish both. Of course, the problem is that without 
explicit coordination between investment decisions this outcome would not be obtained. 
Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) presents a formal model of such interdependence between 
industries and the coordination failure that can result from such interdependence. He 
considers an economy with three goods: x, y, and z where good z serves as a numeraire 
and is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale. Labor is the 
only factor of production and the price of good z equals the wage rate. Good x is 
produced by a competitive industry and it requires good y as an intermediate. The 
technology for good y exhibits large economies of scale and the industry is assumed to be 
oligopolistic where the number of firms is endogenously determined to ensure zero 
profits in equilibrium. A coordination problem arises in the industry because the derived 
demand for the intermediate good y depends upon its price, which in turn determines 
incentives for entry into the intermediate sector. If y-producers anticipate low demand for 
their good, given the fixed costs of entry, few of them would want to enter implying a 
higher price for the intermediate which may then make industry x unsustainable – the key 
assumption here is that the intermediate good y must be locally supplied. On the other 
hand, if y producers are assured of a high demand for their product, more of them would 
enter and such entry would lower its price which would then allow the high demand for   14
the intermediate to be sustained.
5 Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) shows that there is no unique 
equilibrium in a small open economy with the above production structure. In the bad 
equilibrium, the economy ends up specializing in good z where in the good equilibrium it 
produces both goods x and y and exports good x to the rest of the world (where the latter 
equilibrium Pareto dominates the former).  
Turning to policy analysis, Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) suggests that three types of 
traditional government intervention can help ensure that the good equilibrium is realized: 
(a) the government can provide a production subsidy to either x or y industry (or both) 
thereby causing the two sectors to expand or (b) provide an export subsidy to the x sector; 
or (c) shut off international trade. However, he notes that trade protection can be effective 
only if the autarkic equilibrium production of good x is sufficiently large – something that 
is less likely to be true of small developing countries. In addition to traditional industrial 
policies (a) and (b), Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) also suggests that the government can play a 
coordinating role between x and y producers by facilitating information exchange 
between them: “…a government may collect information about planned production of the 
x-good and planned demand for the y-good depending upon various price levels of the 
intermediate good. It then collects information about planned production of the y-good. 
Like planning procedures of centralized economies, a government may continue such 
information exchange until it can obtain a consistent plan of the entire economy.”
6 
He is not arguing for a one-time information exchange but rather repeated 
exchanges that help resolve the coordination failure. It is difficult to believe that policy-
makers can effectively execute such information exchange between disjoint industries 
about whose day-to-day business they may know very little. Furthermore, since 
coordination failures are likely to be pervasive, the above policy prescription suggests a 
massive role for government intervention in the process of industrialization. Okuno-
Fujiwara himself is skeptical whether the mechanisms captured by his model and the 
policy prescriptions that emerge from his analysis had any practical analog in the 
                                                 
5 As will be discussed below, good x could be produced by multinationals that establish local production, 
thus obviating the coordination problem. 
6 Much of the effort of MITI and the Ministry of Finance in Japan can be described as the interchange of 
information among firms and the interaction with the government to reduce any obstacles to the  realization 
of consistent plans. The same is true of French indicative planning of the 1950s and 1960s. As noted   15
Japanese experience. 
In a paper along the lines of Okuno-Fujiwara (1988), Rodrik (1996) argues that 
for coordination failures between upstream and downstream industries to exist, it is 
necessary that there be some type of scale economies in production and that imperfect 
tradability holds across national borders of some of the goods, services, or technologies 
associated with manufacturing. Of course, as noted above, both of these conditions are 
met in Okuno-Fujiwara (1988)’s model. But Rodrik’s analysis adds value in two respects. 
First, in his model the intermediate good sector is characterized by monopolistic 
competition rather than oligopoly. Second, he suggests an interesting interpretation of the 
nontradable intermediate goods sector: “…my preferred interpretation is to think of these 
inputs as representing different categories of specialized skill labor.” The idea is that a 
worker’s decision to acquire any skill depends upon demand for that skill and it is indeed 
quite costly or simply infeasible to import labor services should certain skills be in short 
supply locally. 
In Rodrik’s model, there are two final goods sectors: the high-tech sector requires 
a range of intermediate inputs that are produced under increasing returns to scale and are 
non-tradable (as in Ethier, 1982) whereas the low-tech sector uses only labor and capital. 
For the high-tech sector to be viable in an economy, it needs to produce a sufficiently 
large number of intermediate inputs. As a result, if the entry decisions of intermediate 
goods producers are not coordinated, the economy can easily get stuck in an equilibrium 
where only the low-tech good is produced even though the high-tech good is profitable.
7 
 The problem is that no intermediate goods producer has an incentive to begin 
production unless a relatively large number of intermediates are already being produced. 
If one takes Rodrik’s interpretation of specialized intermediates as being some types of 
skilled labor, the coordination problem may be less intractable than he suggests. For 
example, in some countries there has been a cycle of emigration and repatriation of those 
who are highly educated as happened in India’s software sector, discussed below, as well 
as Korea and Taiwan (China).
8 In all three cases many students acquired more advanced 
                                                                                                                                                 
earlier, it is difficult to assess whether such sector specific targeting was successful. For an extensive 
review of the empirical evidence on Japan, see Noland and Pack, 2003. 
7 A similar argument has also been made by Rodriguez-Clare (1996b). 
8 A detailed study of the Silicon Valley-Taiwan (China) nexus is provided by Saxenian (2001).   16
education than could be used at the time of their graduation, emigrated and later played a 
critical role in the expansion of their respective countries. The synchronization of 
education and the demand for it is almost certainly impossible to plan but recognizing the 
role of emigration and potential return mitigates the problem though clearly the first best 
solution of harmonization would be more desirable especially in light of potential 
permanent residence abroad. 
It is worth noting, that like Okuno-Fujiwara (1988), Rodrik (1996) is quite 
hesitant to offer strong policy recommendations based on his analysis and he concludes 
that government intervention designed to resolve such coordination failures “must be 
judged a risky strategy”. Thus the World Bank’s (1993) well-known report on the East 
Asian miracle argues that East Asian efforts to coordinate investment decisions led to a 
number of inefficient industries. 
While the theoretical rationale for redressing coordination failure appears to be 
sound, the argument rests on certain key assumptions, particularly that the organization of 
production activity is exogenously given. Why would industries whose profitability is so 
intimately intertwined not find ways to help coordinate decisions as is the case of the 
many international supply networks (Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003, Sturgeon and Lester, 
2002, 2003)? For example, vertical integration between intermediate and final goods 
producers can help resolve some coordination problems although there are clearly limits 
to the extent to which organizations can adjust their scale and scope in order to solve 
coordination problems. At some point, all firms have to interact with others via the 
market. But long-term contracts between firms have been used to solve problems of 
relation specific investments in many industries. It is not clear why contracts cannot play 
the same role in the context of coordination failures.   
Perhaps the biggest problem with the coordination failure argument is that it relies 
heavily on the assumption of non-tradable intermediate inputs, partly reflecting the fact 
that much of the early literature was based on the example of steel and autos circa 1960 
rather than the products in which transportation costs for the intermediate are likely to be 
low. Virtually all of the models make this assumption despite the fact that the majority of 
international trade is in intermediate goods. Thus, the coordination failure argument runs 
up against the central fact around which much of the ‘new’ trade theory has been built.   17
This is no small contradiction and if the coordination failure story has to be rescued it 
needs to appeal to nontradable services as in Rodriguez-Clare (1996a). But the problem 
then is that the case for industrial policy on the basis of coordination failures is quite thin 
if inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is feasible and/or permitted. If local firms do 
not produce sufficient number of intermediates due to coordination failures, why can’t 
they be produced by foreign multinationals that are surely not dependent upon the 
production structure of any one economy? In small developing countries, a large-scale 
investment by a multinational can create sufficient demand for intermediates and easily 
resolve the coordination problem. In fact, this is partly what the literature on backward 
linkage effects of FDI argues (see Markusen and Venables, 1999 and Rodriguez-Clare, 
1996a). It is quite unlikely that multinational firms would be hostage to the type of 
coordination problems that confront small producers in developing countries. Indeed, the 
huge growth in the importance of international supply chains established by MNCs has 
become one of the most visible features of industrial growth in the last decade (Sturgeon 
and Lester, 2002). In section 2E we further discuss the role multinational firms can play 
in determining the overall case for industrial policy.  
D.  Informational externalities 
In a recent paper, Rodrik (2004) has argued that the traditional view of industrial 
policy (based on technological and pecuniary externalities) is out-dated and does not 
capture the complexities that characterize the process of industrialization. According to 
Rodrik (2004), industrial policy is more about eliciting information from the private 
sector than it is about addressing distortions by first-best instruments.  He envisions 
industrial policy as a strategic collaboration between the private and public sectors the 
primary goal of which is to determine areas in which a country has comparative 
advantage. The fundamental departure of this viewpoint from classical trade theory is that 
entrepreneurs may lack information about where the comparative advantage of a country 
lies. Or more to the point, at the micro level, entrepreneurs may simply not know what is 
profitable and what is not.  
In the presence of informational externalities, a free rider problem arises between 
initial investors and subsequent ones. Suppose no one knows whether activity x is 
profitable or not and the uncertainty can only be resolved by making a sunk investment   18
that cannot be recovered in case the outcome turns out to be unfavorable. If there is free 
entry ex post, no entrepreneur may be willing to make the investment required to discover 
the profitability of activity x: if someone does make the investment and the activity turns 
out to be profitable, other entrepreneurs will be attracted to the same activity thereby 
eliminating all rents. It is worth noting that Baldwin’s (1969) classic paper anticipates 
Rodrik’s argument almost exactly. He wrote “…suppose, for example, that a potential 
entrant into a new industry, if he could provide potential investors with a detailed market 
analysis of the industry, could borrow funds from investors at a rate that would make the 
project socially profitable. However, should this information become freely available to 
other investors and potential competitors, the initial firm might not be able to recoup the 
cost of making the market study….under these circumstances the firm will not finance 
the cost of the study, and a socially beneficial industry will not be established.” Similarly, 
in the context of adoption of high yielding varieties of crops by farmers in developing 
countries, Besley and Case (1993) note that late adopters may learn from early adopters 
when “a technology is of uncertain profitability, some potential adopters may wait until 
they observe whether others have fared well by using it” and that such “externalities are 
potentially important in agricultural technology adoption.” 
Given the importance of this argument for the debate on industrial policy, it is 
useful to consider the framework presented in Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) in some 
detail. They consider a small open economy comprised of two sectors: traditional and 
modern. Labor can move freely across the two sectors. The production technology in the 
traditional sector is constant returns to scale and the presence of a fixed factor generates 
diminishing returns to labor. In the modern sector (that consists of many goods), there are 
constant returns to scale in production but the cost of production of a good depends upon 
an unobserved productivity parameter (θi) that becomes known only when the production 
of a good is attempted (something that requires a time period in which resources must be 
utilized but no production takes place – this is what Baldwin called a ‘market study’). 
The basic idea here is that entrepreneurs lack information about the profitability of 
production of various goods in the modern sector and this information can be obtained 
only by undertaking a sunk investment. 
After uncertainty regarding θi is resolved, entrepreneurs compare their production   19
costs with world prices and produce those goods for which they make monopoly profits 
(which accrue for length of time T -- call this the monopolization period). Of course, once 
information becomes public (which it does in period three when the monopolization 
period has elapsed) there is further entry (into goods that yield positive profits) until all 
profits are competed away to zero.  
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) analyze the laissez-faire equilibrium of the above 
model and compare it to the social planner’s problem in order to derive the market 
failures that result from the presence of informational externalities. They argue that the 
market equilibrium is deficient in two respects. First, the level of investment and 
entrepreneurship delivered by the market does not coincide with the social optimum 
because the entrepreneurs care only about profits and not about economy-wide benefits of 
their investment. 
It is notable that if the monopolization period is very long, the market economy 
can actually deliver too much investment in the modern sector as opposed to too little. 
This suggests that in economies where firms face substantial entry barriers, the 
underinvestment problem noted by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) is not likely to be 
serious. For example, the industrial licensing regime pursued by India during the first 
forty or so years after independence made it quite difficult for firms to enter new markets. 
And the recent literature on the business climate that emphasizes other factors that 
discourage investment such as the time it takes to obtain business permits, telephone 
lines, and other utility hookups further discourages excessive investment in the modern 
sector (World Bank, 2004).
9 Such barriers should have helped protect rents for those that 
did manage to enter profitable markets.  
The second market failure identified by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) is that the 
market equilibrium yields too little specialization – all activities that turn out to be 
profitable are sustained whereas optimality requires that only the one with the highest 
return be pursued. In other words, in their model, while it is optimal for the small open 
economy to only produce the good for which the profit margin is the highest, the market 
solution allows all those that make positive profits to stay in business during the period of 
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monopolization.  
This result reflects the general equilibrium nature of their model and the fact that 
they consider a small open economy. To see this, first note that the modern sector draws 
resources out of the traditional sector and optimality requires that these resources be 
utilized where they generate the largest profits (which happens in the modern good for 
which the productivity parameter (θi is the highest). Second, since the country’s output of 
a good does not affect world price, one can never have a situation where the mark-ups 
across different goods are equalized. Clearly, if world prices changed with a country’s 
exports/output, complete concentration in the modern sector need not obtain. A more 
likely scenario would be that a country should produce higher quantities of modern goods 
for which it has a more favorable productivity draw and lower quantities of other goods. 
Hoff (1997) argues that if initial producers benefit subsequent producers, the case 
for subsidizing initial producers hinges very much on the assumption that the externalities 
operate in a deterministic fashion (i.e. do not involve any uncertainty). She constructs a 
model where initial entrants provide information that is socially valuable by reducing 
uncertainty for potential followers regarding production conditions. In her model, factors 
that increase the informational barrier to entry can actually imply a lower optimal subsidy 
for the infant industry. By contrast, in most existing models, the externalities are assumed 
to remove all uncertainty as opposed to reducing it. Since Hoff’s model is clearly more 
realistic, it is notable that her results weaken the case for subsidizing an infant industry. 
E.  The international dimension: role of exports and FDI  
For small developing countries, the case for industrial policy is rarely a purely 
domestic one. International considerations are fundamental in many respects but the role 
of exports (on the part of domestic firms) and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
received considerable attention.  
A potential rationale for industrial policy in the context of exports arises when 
product quality is unknown to foreign consumers. The informational asymmetry can lead 
to market failure that can then potentially justify some form of intervention. To make the 
argument concrete, we consider below some of the more influential models of industrial 
policy based on asymmetric information in the context of exports. Mayer (1984) argues 
that when foreign consumers lack information about quality, an industrial policy of   21
subsidizing exporters can indeed be a first-best policy. In his two-good model, foreign 
consumers can discern the quality of good one only after purchasing and consuming it 
whereas the quality of the second good can be determined through inspection alone (if the 
first good has been consumed). The intuitive idea behind this assumption is the firms that 
produce good one generate positive externalities for those that produce good two by 
‘cultivating’ the foreign market. Mayer’s view could underlay the important role assigned 
by many analysts to publicly supported trading companies in Japan and the Republic of 
Korea (Lall and Keesing, 1992).  
However, this conclusion has been criticized by Grossman and Horn (1988) since 
in Mayer’s model firms do not choose the quality of their products (i.e. it is exogenous) 
and consumers have pessimistic expectations that are adjusted upwards with experience. 
By contrast, Grossman and Horn (1988) assume that firms choose the quality of their 
products and that consumers form expectations regarding quality using available 
information and being cognizant of the decision problem facing firms – i.e. in their 
model, consumers have rational expectations. Furthermore, the model of Grossman and 
Horn (1988) permits free entry and they focus on the domestic market where quality of 
foreign goods is known whereas the domestic industry is an infant. However, their model 
can easily be interpreted as one of export promotion of a domestic infant industry. 
 The modeling differences would not be terribly important were it not for the fact 
that the more complete model of Grossman and Horn (1988) seems to completely 
overturn the case for a subsidy when an industry faces informational barriers to entry. 
They note that adding an explicit process of reputation acquisition leads to the result that 
infant industry protection actually reduces welfare despite the presence of information 
asymmetry. The logic is as follows. When consumers have rational expectations, they 
pay a price that leaves them indifferent between importing and buying the average 
domestic product. Since the marginal entrant produces goods of lower quality than the 
average firm, new entry provides negative social surplus. Furthermore, temporary 
protection does not alter the incentives for reputation acquisition since it benefits all 
firms. 
A major reason Grossman and Horn’s (1988) results differ from those of Mayer 
(1984) is that they focus on reputation acquisition at the firm level whereas Mayer   22
focuses at the country level – i.e. in the Grossman/Horn view, Toyota can affect only its 
own reputation in foreign markets whereas in Mayer’s model, the experience with Toyota 
also determines how foreign consumers view other Japanese companies such as Honda. 
The difference matters because returns to reputation acquisition are appropriable in the 
Grossman and Horn model whereas they are not in the Mayer model. 
It is worth noting that the conclusions of Grossman and Horn (1988) are not the 
ones reached by Bagwell and Staiger (1989) who argue that if asymmetric information 
blocks the entry of high quality firms, export subsidies can improve welfare by breaking 
the entry barrier facing high quality firms. Thus, whether or not an export subsidy is 
desirable hinges very much on the nature of the distortion that is caused by the presence 
of asymmetric information.
10  
Now we discuss how an argument for industrial policy might arise in the context 
of FDI. Policy intervention with respect to FDI has a long history and the rationale for 
such intervention has frequently been the effects of FDI on productivity of local firms via 
technology transfer as well as linkage effects. The literature on FDI, technology transfer, 
and linkages has been surveyed extensively in Saggi (2002) and here we confine 
ourselves to those aspects of FDI that relate intimately to local industrial development 
and its linkage effects since these correspond quite well to the coordination failure 
rationale for industrial policy.  
There exists a voluminous informal as well as empirical literature on backward 
linkages. For example, the 1996 issue of the World Investment Report was devoted 
entirely to the effects of FDI on backward linkages in host countries. However, analytical 
models that explore the relationship between multinationals and backward linkages in the 
host country are hard to come by. Two prominent examples of such models are Markusen 
and Venables (1999) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996a). Both these studies provide important 
insights regarding the two-way relationship between multinationals and linkages. In the 
models of Rodriguez-Clare (1996a) and Markusen and Venables (1999) the intermediate 
goods sector is monopolistically competitive so that the effects of foreign investment 
occur via altering the incentives for entry into such markets. In both models, Ethier's 
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(1982) formulation of the so-called love-of-variety production function for final goods is 
at the heart of the interaction between multinationals and local suppliers.  
These models emphasize the demand-side effects of multinationals' entry on the 
host economy: multinationals generate derived demand for intermediate goods, thereby 
promoting industrial development of the intermediate goods sector in the host country. 
This demand creation effect exists in both Rodriguez-Clare (1996a) and Markusen and 
Venables (1999). In addition, the Markusen and Venables model also allows for a 
competition effect wherein the entry of a multinational hurts its local rivals. In 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996a), the host country is assumed to be in a `bad' equilibrium where 
the final good is produced only by multinationals. As a result, the competition effect is 
absent in his model (which has substantial richness along other dimensions). The key 
trade-off underlying Rodriguez-Clare’s model is as follows. On the one hand, since 
multinationals produce complex goods, they tend to have a higher demand for specialized 
intermediate inputs per unit of labor relative to domestic firms. On the other hand, by 
assumption, only multinationals have access to intermediates produced abroad and so 
they demand only a fraction of required intermediates from the host country. As a result, 
multinationals enhance backward linkages only when it is relatively expensive to source 
from abroad.
11 
As noted earlier, common problem with analytical models in this area (as well 
those dealing with coordination failures) is the assumption that intermediates are 
nontradable.  These models shut off trade in intermediates and then use FDI as the 
channel that either provides some of those intermediates or increases demand for local 
intermediate goods producers (since multinationals are not allowed to import 
intermediates by assumption). As a result, they are likely to overstate the impact of 
multinationals on industrial development. 
Suppose one accepts the optimistic view regarding the effects of FDI (indeed the 
evidence discussed below suggests that there are reasonable grounds for doing so). Does 
this have implications for industrial policy? Our answer is a qualified yes. Basic 
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can be assumed that the intermediates are supplied efficiently. If production is destined for the domestic 
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economic theory tells us that it is optimal to subsidize an activity if it generates positive 
externalities -- i.e. the activity benefits agents other than those directly involved in the 
activity itself. The potential for positive externalities from FDI surely exists and available 
evidence exists that often this potential is realized. Incentives to attract FDI may be 
justified on the grounds of such externalities from inward FDI. However, such policies 
are not typically what proponents of industrial policy have in mind – indeed the thrust of 
such arguments is typically in favor of encouraging the development of indigenous firms. 
It is worth keeping in mind that investment incentives and tax breaks to multinational 
investors work against their local competitors. Thus, if there exist local firms that could 
potentially compete with multinationals, the adverse effect of tax incentives to 
multinationals on such firms needs to be taken into account. The efficacy of investment 
incentives is also dubious – such policies can end up transferring rents to foreign 
investors without affecting their investment decisions. 
One final insight from the literature on linkage effects of multinational firms is 
worth mentioning. As Rodriguez-Clare (1996a) notes, we should “…expect 
multinationals to generate more linkages when they come from regions that are farther 
away.” The implication for industrial policy with respect to multinationals is clear – if a 
country does want to attract FDI, it ought to focus on firms that come from far off regions 
and are interested in serving the local market. 
In a recent paper, Barrios et. al. (2004) construct a model wherein the competition 
effect generated by a multinational is eventually dominated by the positive externalities it 
generates. Using plant level panel data from the manufacturing sector in Ireland (a 
country whose economic development has been influenced greatly by multinational 
firms) they show that such a model indeed describes the Irish experience with FDI. 
Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003) use plant level data from several Latin American 
countries and they make the important point that many empirical studies testing existing 
theoretical models often use inappropriate measures to evaluate the linkage effects of 
multinationals. More specifically, empirical studies often use the share of inputs 
purchased locally by a multinational to measure its impact on linkages. They argue that 
                                                                                                                                                 
requirements, may have costs above world prices, raising the possibility that greater linkages imply lower 
GDP per capita.   25
the proper measure (as implied by theory) is the ratio of value of inputs bought 
domestically to the total workers hired by a multinational. The distinction between the 
two types of measures is important because multinationals typically source a lower 
percentage of their inputs locally relative to their local competitors. However, it does not 
imply that their linkage effects are necessarily negative since their production techniques 
might require more inputs in relation to the workers they hire. In their empirical work, 
Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare find that the linkage coefficient of multinationals is actually 
higher than that of local firms in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela whereas it is no different 
(statistically) in Mexico.  
Recent case-study evidence regarding the linkage effects of FDI is provided by 
Mexico’s experience with the maquiladora sector and its automobile industry. Mexico 
started the maquiladora sector as part of its Border Industrialization Programme designed 
to attract foreign manufacturing facilities along the US-Mexico border. Most 
maquiladoras began as subsidiaries of US firms that shifted labor-intensive assembly 
operations to Mexico because of its low wage relative to the US. However, the industry 
evolved over time and the maquiladoras now employ sophisticated production 
techniques, many of which have been imported from the US. 
In certain key respects, Mexican experience in the automobile industry is quite 
representative of its overall industrial development. In keeping with the overall strategy 
of import substitution, during the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico imposed domestic content 
requirements on multinationals in the automobile industry. These requirements were less 
stringent than those imposed in Brazil: whereas Brazil required car manufacturers to have 
a domestic content of over 90%, Mexican policy imposed a domestic content requirement 
of “only” 60%. Incidentally, another important difference between Mexican and Brazilian 
policies was that Mexico did not allow foreign firms to vertically integrate with their 
local suppliers while Brazil did. The goal of this nationalistic stance was to ensure that 
domestic firms captured the benefits generated by the backward linkages of FDI.  
An interesting aspect of Mexico’s export performance requirement in the 
automobile industry (as noted by Moran, 1998) was that, unlike countries such as 
Malaysia, Mexico did not require that foreign firms export a particular product (such as a 
finished car) but only that the value of exports be a specified ratio relative to imports.   26
Clearly, such a policy let the car companies decide what to export and what not, leaving 
them free to make their own calculations based on comparative advantage 
considerations.
12 The export performance of the industry has improved remarkably in 
recent years: between 1990 and 1998, the share of exports in output has increased from  
3.7% to a remarkable 68.6%. 
Mexico’s experience in the automobile industry is also illustrative of how FDI can 
contribute to industrial development in the host country though Mexico’s favorable 
experience was facilitated by the NAFTA agreement (Laderman, Maloney, and Serven, 
2003). Initial investments by US car manufactures into Mexico were followed by 
investments not only by Japanese and European car manufacturers but also by firms who 
made automobile parts and components. As a result, competition in the automobile 
industry increases at multiple stages of production thereby improving efficiency. Such a 
pattern of FDI behavior (i.e. investment by one firm was followed by investment by 
others) probably reflects strategic considerations involved in FDI decisions. Most 
multinational firms compete in highly concentrated markets and are highly responsive to 
each other’s decisions. An important implication of this interdependence between 
competing multinationals is that a host country may be able to unleash a sequence of 
investments by successfully inducing FDI from one or two major firms. However, the 
concentration of inward FDI into a handful of LDCs suggests that only a few countries 
can benefit from this process – Tanzania and Egypt are not China.  
Extensive backward linkages resulted from FDI in the Mexican automobile 
industry: within five years of investments by major auto manufacturers, there were 300 
domestic producers of parts and accessories, of which 110 had annual sales of more than 
a million dollars. As per Peres Nunez (1990), multinationals in the Mexican automotive 
sector conducted production audits, held weekly coordination meetings, and provided 
technical training to their suppliers. Foreign producers also transferred technology to such 
domestic suppliers: industry best practices, zero defect procedures, production audits etc. 
were introduced to domestic suppliers thereby improving their productivity and the 
quality of their products. As a result of increased competition and efficiency, Mexican 
exports in the automobile industry boomed. 
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A recent comprehensive case study of the effects of Intel’s investment in Costa 
Rica by Larrain  et. al. (2000) finds evidence that local suppliers benefited substantially 
from Intel’s investment. Similar evidence exists for other sectors and countries and such 
evidence is discussed in great detail in Moran (1998 and 2001). For example, in the 
electronics sector, Moran (2001) notes that in Malaysia, foreign investors helped their 
local subcontractors keep pace with modern technologies by assigning technicians to the 
suppliers' plants to help set up and supervise large-volume automated production and 
testing procedures. In a broader study, Batra and Tan (2002) use data from Malaysia’s 
manufacturing sector to study the effect of multinationals on inter-firm linkages and 
productivity growth during 1985-1995. Their results show that not only are foreign firms 
more involved in inter-firm linkages than domestic firms but also that such linkages are 
associated with technology transfer to local suppliers. Such technology transfers were 
found to have occurred through worker training and the transmission of knowledge that 
helped local suppliers improve the quality and timeliness of supply.
 13  
Javorcik (2004) examines backward linkages and technology spillovers using data 
from the Lithuanian manufacturing sector during the period 1996-2000. She finds that 
firm productivity is positively affected by a sector’s intensity of contacts with 
multinational customers but not by the presence of multinationals in the same industry. 
Thus, her results support vertical spillovers from FDI but not horizontal ones. 
Furthermore, she finds that vertical spillovers are realized only when the technological 
gap between domestic and foreign firms is moderate. Blalock (2001) uses a panel dataset 
from Indonesian manufacturing establishments to check for the same effects. He finds 
strong evidence of a positive impact of FDI on productivity growth of local suppliers 
showing that technology transfer from multinationals indeed takes place. He also 
plausibly suggests that since multinationals tend to source inputs that require simple 
technologies relative to the final products they produce, local firms that manufacture such 
intermediates may be in a better position to learn from multinationals than those that 
compete with them. 
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This review of arguments for industrial policy indicates the enormous difficulties 
of implementation of industrial policies. The range and depth of knowledge that policy 
makers would have to master to implement a successful policy is extraordinary. They 
would have to understand the relevance of, and be accurately informed about, a huge 
range of complex questions and have the ability to accurately evaluate very subtle 
differences. A subset of the issues on which policy makers would have to be 
knowledgeable derived from the preceding discussion includes: 
1.  whether consumers learn the quality of a good only after consuming rather 
than inspecting it;  
2.  whether firms that are trying to reduce production costs also begin a 
simultaneous effort to improve their product’s quality to obtain a better  
reputation.  
3.  which firms and industries generate knowledge spillovers  
4.  which firms and industries benefit from dynamic scale economies – what 
is the precise path of such learning and the magnitude of the cost 
disadvantage at each stage of the learning process 
5.  which sectors have a long-term comparative advantage 
6.  knowledge of the size of scale economies of different firms and sectors in 
order to facilitate investment coordination 
7.  the potential effects of FDI or international trade in solving some of the 
coordination problems, including a detailed knowledge of which of tens of 
thousands of intermediates are tradable 
8.  a better sense than individual firms possess about their potential 
competitiveness 
9.  the nature and extent of capital market failures 
10.  the magnitude and direction of inter-industry spillovers 
11.  the relative amount of learning by individual firms from others and from 
their own experience 
12.  the extent to which early entrants generate benefits for future entrants 
13.  the extent of heterogeneity of firms’ learning abilities   29
14.  a forecast of which firms can create new knowledge and discover better 
production methods. 
15.  the spillover effects of FDI as well as the likely intensity of their purchase 
of domestic intermediates 
  
It is possible that government officials might be this omniscient but the 
performance of the portfolio managers in developed country stock markets suggests that 
few of the very well trained (and remunerated) equity analysts can evaluate even much 
more certain and grosser characteristics of existing firms and industries with long track 
records. Nor do industrial firms themselves have the ability to successfully forecast such 
developments.  Acknowledging that a first best policy would argue for the government to 
address such market failures or externalities, the task is daunting. Quite apart from the 
dangers of optimal policy being subverted by industries and firms that would benefit, the 
sheer knowledge and skill requirements would exceed that possessed by almost any 
institution including the best consulting firms. On a far more circumscribed set of tasks, 
measuring and explaining the sources of lower total factor productivity for a small 
number of sectors in South Korea and Brazil relative to the United States, McKinsey & 
Co., a preeminent consulting firm spent several years and employed dozens of people 
whose qualifications exceed those possessed by officials in almost any developing 
country (McKinsey Global Institute, 1998a, 1998b). 
No study has attempted to assess whether governments have been successful in 
mastering any of these 15 issues (or others that can be derived from our discussion) that 
have to be addressed. The evaluation of industrial policy has to evaluate its success  by 
the realized results of either firms or industries that have been encouraged. The 
underlying market failures or externalities that contributed to the decision to foster a firm 
or sector cannot be identified from the policy such as subsidized directed credit. Only the 
effects of the policy can be assessed. We now turn to this task. 
 
3. Does industrial policy work? 
As noted earlier, it is impossible to offer a single agreed-upon counterfactual to 
evaluate the past success of industrial policy targeted to individual industries. Thus there   30
have been a number of research strategies pursued to provide an empirical evaluation of 
industrial policy. These have been reviewed in Noland and Pack (2003). Not all of the 
methods have been explored for all countries. Researchers have examined, inter alia, the 
impact of: (1) trade protection; (2) subsidies to R&D; (3) general subsidies; and (4) 
preferential lending rates on the evolution of productivity and capital accumulation.  Few 
of the empirical analyses find that sectoral targeting has been particularly effective.  
Consider some of the evidence. In Japan, more than 80 percent of on-line budget 
subsidies were devoted to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the 1955-80 period, the 
peak of Japan’s industrial policy efforts.
14 Implicit tax subsides for investment were 
highest in the mining sector, and quite low in the high technology sectors. Government 
subsidies to R&D were also small. Unless elasticities of investment and R&D with 
respect to subsides were implausibly high, their effect was limited. Industries that were 
encouraged did not experience significantly faster rates of TFP growth than others, and 
R&D subsidies were largely ineffective.  
Beason and Weinstein (1996) examined the connection between industrial policy 
and sectoral TFP growth in Japan.  Working with a 13 sector sample for the period 1955-
1990, they fail to uncover evidence that preferential policies (measured by the effective 
rates of protection, taxes, or subsidies) targeted sectors with increasing returns to scale or 
that they contributed to the rate of capital accumulation in sectors or their TFP growth.  
They did find some evidence that prior to the first oil shock, industrial policy targeted 
sectors with high labor usage. Lawrence and Weinstein (2001) extended this research 
employing a slightly different data set and found that differential corporate tax rates had 
an impact on sectoral TFP growth, while direct subsidies and subsidized loans did not.  
Moreover, they find the paradoxical result the effective rate of protection was negatively 
associated with sectoral TFP growth and that imports, not exports, were positively 
associated with TFP growth.   
The latter result can be explained by noting that there are at least two channels 
through which imports could contribute to increasing productivity. The first allows 
domestic producers to use new, improved, or highly specialized intermediate inputs to 
which they would not otherwise have access.  The second is imports compete with 
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domestic products and their availability acts as a constant spur to domestic producers to 
cut costs and improve quality.  Lawrence and Weinstein divide imports into 
“competitive” and “noncompetitive” imports and in the case of Japan, find evidence to 
support the second hypothesis.  From this they conclude that Japan’s growth would have 
been even faster if it had cut tariffs and exposed a greater share of its domestic producers 
to foreign competition.
15 
Lee (1996) following a method broadly similar to Beason and Weinstein finds a 
similar lack of impact of Korean industrial policies on sectoral capital accumulation or 
TFP. Pack (2000) follows a different path, assuming that TFP in favored manufacturing 
sectors was in fact increased in both Japan and Korea and estimates how much of an 
impact even an assumed successful policy could have had on the growth of gross 
domestic product. The most favorable estimate is a roughly .5 percentage point increase 
out of a total GDP growth rate of roughly 10 percent over the relevant periods. While this 
is significant, it is hardly the magical key to accelerated growth.  
It is possible that the impact of industrial policy is manifest largely in sectors that 
purchased inputs from the promoted sectors, even if the latter did not themselves benefit. 
However, Pack (2000) finds that sectors that were encouraged had few linkages with non-
favored sectors via input-output relations and there is little evidence of labor flowing 
from favored to neglected sectors, a likely mechanism for the transmission of knowledge.  
  Nevertheless, as noted at the beginning of this paper, the difficulty of 
constructing a single agreed upon counterfactual precludes a robust conclusion. 
Moreover, all of the empirical analysis examines the contemporaneous impact of policies, 
for example, did Korean industries that were encouraged experience greater TFP growth 
in the period during which the stimulation occurred, 1973-85.  Someone doubting these 
results could point to the performance of some Korean firms such as Samsung and LG in 
the following two decades in such diverse product lines as plasma TVs, RAM chips, and 
cellular phones, and attribute these later successes to the earlier stimulation the firms 
received for other product lines. (In the typology above, the Korean Economic Planning 
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Board had mastered skills 2, 4, 8, 12, and 14). These more recent efforts by the firms that 
allowed them to succeed could be attributed, in this interpretation, to their earlier growth 
in other product categories. In this view, learning to perform R&D on microwaves, had 
future carryover effects on plasma TV. Fully resolving divergent views is impossible. 
Even detailed firm histories by Kim (1997) or Hobday (1995) do not suggest only one 
line of causality.  
Nevertheless, even if it should be shown that the success of a few firms could be 
attributed to earlier encouragement by the government, the aggregate effects just cited 
suggest there was not a major impact at the national level during the main period of 
growth acceleration. And any such effects would have to be weighed against the negative 
long run impacts in the financial sector cited by those skeptical of industrial policy. For 
example, the Asian financial crises of the late 1990s and Japan’s stagnation since 1990 
can be interpreted as partly the result of the earlier government direction of lending that 
minimized the need of banks to learn modern techniques of evaluating individual projects 
and managing the riskiness of their overall portfolio.  
4. New industrial policy 
  Recent discussion of “new” industrial policy including the desirability of 
fostering learning and obtaining benefits from agglomeration economies offered by 
industrial clusters has received little systematic empirical evaluation. In principle, the 
development of clusters could facilitate growing productivity through the provision of 
overhead services by the organizers plus the interaction of the firms choosing to enter the 
cluster. Thus clusters could offer an alternative to dependence on either buyer or 
manufacturer led networks.   
The benefit of clusters may arise from face-to-face interactions that are 
productivity enhancing (interactions between software writers and chip manufacturers), a 
pool of workers with the relevant skills, and reduced transportation costs. Individual 
market agents may not be aware of the externality they generate for others and this 
provides an additional market failure that could in principle be addressed by public 
intervention. In the U.S., where there is a favorable environment for the policy-induced 
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generation of agglomeration, many states and metropolitan regions have attempted to 
attract firms in similar industrial niches in order to achieve a “critical” mass. Notable 
successes have occurred in the research triangle in North Carolina centered on Duke 
University, the University of North Carolina, and North Carolina State University. Others 
such as the Route 128 corridor in Massachusetts and Silicon Valley were generated 
spontaneously largely as a result of the presence of major research universities, an 
innovative and entrepreneurial faculty and high quality PhD students.  Moreover, both 
agglomerations were contiguous to major cities, Boston and San Francisco, attractive 
consumption venues to the highly educated employees. In contrast, the presence of 
Cornell University, the University of Rochester, and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,  
along with such major research organizations as IBM and Corning have not engendered a 
comparable agglomeration in upstate New York, despite efforts by the state government 
to staunch the significant decline of the region in employment. More generally, state 
governments and region wide efforts to attract firms to science parks have not been 
generally successful.  
The difficulty of replicating Silicon Valley in the U.S. is paralleled by the absence 
of major success stories in developing countries.
16 The rapid development of the software 
sector in Bangalore and other cities in India, discussed below, appears to be the outcome 
of the existence of a large group of well educated English speaking students and the 
entrepreneurial abilities of a small group of residents combined with the awareness of 
their existence on the part of the large Indian expatriate community, particularly in 
Silicon Valley. Government participation was non-existent – a critical communications 
satellite was financed by Hewlett-Packard. Positive government efforts followed the 
“takeoff” of the sector. Of course, publicly financed education institutions generated the 
fundamental resource, educated workers. This might be considered a generic policy not 
specifically targeted to the software sector but there was no explicit effort to galvanize 
the agglomeration economies that have since developed. 
There are interesting descriptions of a number of clusters in OECD nations but 
few normative evaluations of their success employing social cost benefit analyses or even 
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grosser measures such as growth of exports relative to firms outside of the cluster but in 
the same sector.
17 However, some insights can be obtained about whether some recent 
success stories in Asia conform to the contours of the new industrial policy. We consider 
in detail the evolution of the Indian software sector centered in Bangalore. The 
development of the software sector was attributable primarily to activities of private 
actors. Its success reflected a complex set of interactions between domestic and foreign 
responses to perceived opportunities. Many of the same patterns, with different details, 
can be documented for other success stories such as the Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan 
(Saxenian 1999, 2001), the Special Economic Zones in China (Rosen, 1999, Huang, 
2002), and Bangladesh’s rise as a clothing exporter (Rhee, 2000). In the Indian software 
sector and the Bangladeshi garment sector, the initiating force was private, the 
government playing almost no role except for the fundamental one in India of providing 
good education, a policy that does not fall into the domain of selective industrial policy. 
In Taiwan (China) the establishment of a science park and legislation in China to 
allow special economic zones to attract FDI were due to an initial government stimulus. 
A critical input for the success was  foreign participation that dealt with some of the roles 
cited above as requisites of industrial policy (source of new technology, facilitation of 
learning, source of new product ideas, centralized marketing allowing economies of 
scope, and coordination of entry of complementary firms). In China, the SEZs mimicked 
the effect that would have arisen from a free trade policy, i.e., it negated previous adverse 
public policies. It did not discriminate among sectors. The decision to foster a science 
park by Taiwan (China) comes closer to a proactive industrial policy. Unfortunately, the 
experience at Hsinchu has not been systematically evaluated. 
Many nations have attempted to use export-processing zones of one form or 
another to catalyze foreign direct investment and perhaps generate agglomeration 
economies. Evaluation of these suggests that while potentially a useful instrument, they 
have had indifferent results.
18 Success stories can be pointed to in Korea and Taiwan 
(China) in the 1950s and early 1960s, and of course in the special economic zones of 
China. But there have been more than a thousand such efforts. There are few clues in the 
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existing literature about why some EPZs have been successful, while most have failed. 
A.  The Indian software sector 
In India, the preconditions for the development of the software sector were high 
quality education in junior colleges and universities financed by the government. A 
critical role was played by university graduates who went abroad for further training, 
remained as expatriates in the high tech sector, and later returned home or interacted 
intensively with newer Indian firms. The lamented brain drain became, with some lag, a 
paradoxical source of strength and a critical catalytic input (this was also true in the case 
of Hsinchu). 
In the 1980s there were a growing number of programming graduates and many 
were underemployed. There were a large number of graduates at levels ranging from post 
secondary technical schools to those trained at the Indian Institutes of Technology. 
Almost all of the students trained in programming had been educated in English. The 
government’s continuing investments in education had resulted in over 1,800 educational 
institutions and polytechnics producing 70,000 to 85,000 computer science graduates 
every year.
19 Many Indian graduates also had a second university degree or post-graduate 
degree from the United States or the United Kingdom, often in computer technology
20. 
Other Indian software programmers received training in private software institutes to 
keep abreast of the latest developments in the software industry and acquire a breadth of 
software skills. Hence, many were familiar with major computer hardware systems (IBM, 
UNISYS, DEC, HP and DG
21), computer-aided software engineering tools, object-
oriented programming, graphical user interface and client networking
22.  
An effort to insure greater local competence in computer production inadvertently 
contributed to the growth of software. In 1977 increasing pressures to increase 
domestically controlled computer production led the Indian government to demand that 
IBM allow Indians to hold 60% of its equity if it wished to continue its operations in 
India.  IBM responded by shutting down its operations in India within 6 months. IBM’s 
departure turned out to be a boon to the Indian computer software industry if not to the 
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hardware sector.  Without being constrained to proprietary operating systems used in 
IBM computers, software professionals turned to the cheaper open platforms for 
programming, especially UNIX. When U.S. firms decided to migrate from mainframe 
and minicomputer-based systems to UNIX-based client server systems in the 1980s, 
Indian programmers’ adeptness with UNIX relative to their Western counterparts, who 
were stuck with the “conceptual baggage of legacy systems”
23 made them highly sought 
after. Indian programmers were thus better prepared for many applications than 
programmers in other developing countries that may have had similar wage structures. In 
the 1970s the Indian government standardized on UNIX and since it purchased one-half 
of all computers, its demand contributed to the growth of these skills among 
programmers. Government demand rather than FDI provided the basis for the expansion 
of output in the sector, an unintended industrial policy similar to that pursued by the 
Japanese government in the supercomputer sector (which did not succeed).  
Nevertheless, the major impetus to demand came from abroad in the form of a set 
of “accidents.” In the 1990s the ratio of world prices for programming services relative to 
those in India increased due to a global shortage of programmers and the demands for 
solutions to the anticipated Y2K problem.  Enterprising businesses in India capitalized on 
this opportunity by setting up firms that were essentially employment agencies. Indian 
software programmers were hired by local firms on behalf of clients in the United States 
on short-term contracts (either for a fixed period of time or on a project basis) to provide 
onsite services. ‘Bodyshopping’, as this practice was called, became the predominant 
mode of Indian software exports because the development work was performed on the 
client’s premises, saving software firms the high costs of acquiring computer hardware. 
NASSCOM, the software trade association reported that the software sector earned $2.5 
billion from Y2K billing from 1996 to 1999, a critical period in the growth of the 
industry. As late as 1988 software exports had been less than $200 million but had risen 
to $3.6 billion by 1998, accounting for over 10 percent of total Indian exports.  
  Indian software firms also benefited from another serendipitous event, the 
European Union’s move to the Euro. Many Indian software professionals have been 
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actively involved in adapting existing computer systems and databases to accommodate 
the Euro. Between 2000 and 2002, it is estimated that India earned approximately $3 
billion in revenues from these Euro-related IT projects
24. Clearly a contributory factor 
was the low relative level of programming costs in India that conferred a Ricardian 
comparative advantage in some sub-sectors of software. As late as 1995, after substantial 
wage increases because of a rising demand for Indian software, the annual wages of 
Indian software professionals were only 14% to 59% that of their counterparts in 
Switzerland, USA, Canada and the UK. Given the skills of Indian programmers, these 
cost savings led firms in some of the industrial countries to outsource their software 
development requirements to India.  
While the precise sequence of events leading to a focus on say India rather than 
the Philippines which exhibited even lower wages is not easily reconstructed given the 
familiarity with English of educated Filipinos but the Indian expatriate community in the 
U.S. was certainly a part of the process. In addition, Indian programming firms had 
engaged in capital stretching efforts due to tariffs on computers that permitted the 
inefficient domestic hardware industry to charge high prices. Even after restrictions on 
hardware imports were relaxed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the tariffs imposed on 
the imports made it too expensive to acquire state-of-the art computer systems or to 
upgrade frequently.  With less than frontier computers, Indian software developers 
“worked hard and successfully to get every available bit and byte out of what computing 
power they had.”
25 This equipped Indian software programmers with the ability to write 
the optimized programs that set them apart from their potential low cost competitors, an 
unintended indirect benefit of India’s ISI policy. 
 The circumstances just described suggest the relevance of Brian Arthur’s view 
that idiosyncratic events, tariffs on imported hardware, the Y2K problem, and the shift to 
the Euro, exert positive feedback and generated a succession of mutually reinforcing 
benefits. In terms of industrial policy, of whatever form, it seems unlikely that any 
government could have foreseen and acted upon the demand generated by Y2K and the 
Euro or anticipated the impact on programming skills of expensive computer hardware. 
                                                 
24 IDSA (2000). 
25 McDowell (1995)   38
The government’s main contribution had been to provide high quality university 
education.
26 
B.  The foreign role 
One of the major contributors to the Indian software sector was the large number 
of expatriate Indian IT professionals located in Silicon Valley. The prominence of Indian 
expatriates in Silicon Valley has been remarkable. In 1998, 774 (or 9%) of the high 
technology firms were led by Indian CEOs.
27  Many of them helped to convince large 
firms such as Oracle, Novell, and Bay Networks to establish operations in India.
28 The 
impact of this community can be seen in the ownership structure of Indian firms in 2000 
shown below. Forty eight percent of Indian software firms were foreign owned, joint 
ventures, or owned by Indian nationals with intensive participation by foreigners. 
Although foreign wholly owned firms only make up a small fraction of the software firms 
in India, they account for a disproportionately large share of the investment made by the 
software industry. 
 
Ownership structure of Indian 
software firms in 2000
29 
 
100% Indian  52.1 
100% foreign  12.1 
Joint Venture    8.9 
Indian with foreign connections  24.2 
 
These and other expatriates also invested in India, started firms, helped raise U.S. 
venture capital, provided expertise, and convinced venture capital firms to operate in 
India or pay greater attention to opportunities in India.
30  In recent years, non-resident 
Indians, NRIs, have gone a step further in assisting the Indian software industry. Aware 
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of the obstacles some Indians face in raising capital for their software startups they 
actively raised venture capital from U.S. investment firms and organized conferences in 
the U.S. to heighten the awareness of the potential of India’s software industry
31. A group 
of NRIs in the U.S. also founded TIE (The IndUS Entrepreneurs), a mentoring group for 
technology entrepreneurs in India to network with their counterparts in the U.S. and learn 
from their experiences
32. Finally, NRIs were actively involved in lobbying efforts urging 
the Government of India to revamp its telecommunication policies and other regulations 
that have impeded the growth of the Indian software industry
33.  
Foreign direct investment accounted for a large percentage of early investment in 
the sector. For example, in 1996, foreign companies accounted for 70% of the investment 
in software development in Bangalore.
34 And this contribution understates the true 
impact. Texas Instruments (TI), the first foreign firm to establish an offshore software 
facility in Bangalore in 1984 after IBM’s departure, augmented Bangalore’s inadequate 
land-based telecommunication infrastructure by investing in its own satellite 
communications network, in conjunction with Videsh Sanchar Nigam (VSNL), the 
government’s overseas communication agency
35.  Some of TI’s lines were later leased to 
other software firms, enabling them to expand their India-based operations instead of 
relying solely on onsite services abroad. Until the government built software technology 
parks in the 1990s linked to earth stations and other telecommunications infrastructure, 
TI’s satellite network remained an important driving force behind the offshore 
development of software exports.  
Once U.S. based firms had become interested in India, Bangalore’s reputation for 
technical excellence and its abundant supply of IT graduates from its 3 universities, 14 
engineering colleges and 47 polytechnic schools
36 made it a natural choice for foreign 
companies to locate their software firms.  
The foreign role has been of major importance as it provided much of the 
infrastructure and international knowledge that allowed Indian firms to exploit 
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international opening. In addition, Indian software firms also benefited from foreign joint 
ventures and partnerships because they create markets for Indian software exports.  At the 
same time these firm provide distribution networks for Indian firms attempting to move 
upstream. A foreign firm typically outsources its software requirements to its Indian 
partner, thus providing it a direct and steady source of income. Moreover, partnerships 
with foreign firms add to the credibility to an Indian firm and act as endorsements of its 
quality and reliability without government encouragement. The advantage seems to have 
been firm specific, ala Grossman-Horn rather than Mayer. Thus, other foreign firms 
looking to outsource their software development would invariably choose a software firm 
with a proven track record with another foreign company. Lastly, for small Indian firms 
attempting to move out of the low-end of the software business by venturing into 
software packages, having foreign partners is an asset because of their established 
distribution networks, knowledge of the recent trends in the software market (due to 
proximity to the demand in the U.S.) and significantly lower marketing costs. Since as 
much as 70% to 80% of the final price of a software package arises from marketing
37, 
small Indian firms without a known brand, an extensive sales network or sufficient 
revenue  find it more profitable to sell its packages via a foreign collaborator.  
How does this experience of a very successful sector square with the many 
strands of new industrial policy? All of it was privately initiated, governments at various 
levels becoming involved only after the success of the sector was evident. The industry 
expanded on the basis of comparative advantage and never needed any protection. 
Indeed, one advantage of the software sector was that its inputs, largely downloads from 
satellites and its output, uploaded to satellites, could not easily be taxed by the Indian 
authorities. A symbiosis of foreign and domestic firms was critical. Though there was 
clearly an agglomeration of firms in Bangalore, this was the effect of the presence of the 
graduates of the local education system. But this was achieved spontaneously without 
government direction. Foreign contracts rather than government subsidies provided the 
basis for international exploration of markets. There is no evidence of government 
initiation or preference.  
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5.   Is industrial policy still relevant? 
From Hamilton and List to contemporary discussions of industrial policy, the 
implicit framework has been that of a firm producing tradable goods at an initial cost 
disadvantage given the limited industrial history of the country, learning to become more 
efficient, and then competing with imports in the local market or successfully exporting. 
The marketing of the efficiently manufactured product was implicitly assumed to be 
routine. Reduction of production costs whether through internal learning-by-doing or 
through spillovers within industrial clusters was viewed as paramount. In discussions of 
post-war Asian experience some attention was given to the catalytic role of Japanese, 
Korean, and Taiwanese trading companies in assembling large quantities of goods and 
achieving scale economies in marketing but this activity was not given center stage (Lall 
and Keesing, 1992). Even if countries could now pursue the export oriented policies of 
four decades ago in Korea and Taiwan (China), it is not clear that they would be 
efficacious given the changed nature of both retailing and production networks.  
In the last two decades there has been a shift in the institutional mechanism of 
international trade. Two types of organization have evolved: (a) international production 
networks, IPN, in which a producing firm organizes large numbers of suppliers in a 
number of locations; (b) buyer-led networks in which large retail chains provide 
specifications for the desired final product and encourage suppliers in developing 
countries to organize their own production system that most often includes large numbers 
of local subcontractors.
38 These networks have become increasingly important, and are 
dominant in clothing and electronics and growing in importance in other products such as 
automotive components.
39 In East Asia in recent years components “constitute at least a 
fifth of manufacturing exports and … have typically grown 4-5 percent faster than overall 
trade in East Asia” (Yusuf et. al., 2003, p. 272).  
One effect of the growing importance of IPNs is their efficiency at organizing 
production and continuously reducing costs so that the global price that non-member 
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firms must compete with shifts down rapidly. Infant firms undergoing learning face other 
hurdles: rapidly improving quality; changing characteristics of existing products (Ernst, 
2002); and an array of new goods that compete with existing ones.  For firms attempting 
to enter export markets, it cannot be assumed that simply achieving low cost is sufficient 
to realize foreign sales. There is no guarantee that lead firms will be able to identify one 
or two firms in a small African nation. The existence of supply networks imposes a 
significant challenge to LDC firms that are not embedded in such a network as the lead 
firms usually succeed in generating higher performance in design, engineering, the 
effective use of information and communication technology, and the ability to coordinate 
production in several locations. (Yusuf et. al., p. 278).
40 
Further militating against the classical view of infant industries is the change in 
the nature of retailing. Consider a mundane product such as socks that can be produced 
efficiently with relatively labor intensive technology. Huge retailers such as Walmart and 
Target buy these in quantities of millions that typically exceed the production capacity of 
small (by international standards) industries. The special economic zones in China have 
become a series of clusters that produce enormous quantities of socks, ties, and other 
clothing. Retailers and wholesalers place very large orders that are well beyond the 
production capacities of smaller firms even if these have learned sufficiently rapidly to 
become cost competitive in relatively small quantities. “These days buyers from New 
York to Tokyo want to be able to buy 500,000 pairs of socks all at once, or 300,000 
neckties, 100,000 children’s jackets…” (Barboza, 2004). European firms buy smaller, 
more varied products but expect local suppliers to provide “in-house design and sample 
making capabilities that would allow them to translate and adapt the design from 
Europe.” (Sturgeon and Lester, 2002, p. 49).   
In textiles, clothing, electronics, auto parts and other sectors being a part of an 
IPN is critical to exporting and upgrading of quality. Firms that are not part of such 
networks may not succeed even if they are as efficient as members in production costs.  
Local participants in the network must “label track, respond to product orders in real time 
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on the basis of style, color, fabric, and size; exchange information on an ... electronic 
basis, provide goods to a retailer’s distribution center that can be efficiently moved to 
stores … including containers with bar codes concerning contents” (Yusuf, p. 283). 
These requirements, now fairly standard in many product areas, suggest that successful 
penetration of OECD markets will become increasingly difficult for nations that have not 
yet industrialized. 
In electronics, an important efficient, labor-intensive growth sector in the past for 
many of the Asian countries, much of the production is now carried out by contract 
manufacturers whose size has grown enormously in the last decade. Firms such as 
Solectron and Flextronics now undertake activity that was formerly under the aegis of 
major developed country firms who have outsourced the activity. Examining the location 
of several activities: headquarters, manufacturing, materials purchasing and management, 
new production introduction centers, and after sales repair centers, Sturgeon and Lester 
(2002) show that most of these activities of Solectron, the largest of the contract 
manufacturers, take place in developed countries or the more advanced semi-
industrialized nations contiguous to them such as Mexico, Puerto Rico, Romania, and 
Turkey. Ernst, 2002 (p. 24) confirms these results and points out that specialized clusters 
in countries such as the Nordic nations, the U.S., France, and Germany are major sources 
as are Singapore, Hungary, Israel, Korea, and Taiwan (China). Poorer countries even if 
they have a potential cost advantage after a long learning period will have trouble 
breaking into these existing circuits. 
  Moreover, China and India present formidable competitors as demonstrated by 
the concern over the termination of the multi-fiber agreement and the potential losses 
incurred by nations that formerly had guaranteed access to OECD markets. While it 
might be argued that the two giant nations will encounter rising wages and thus enter 
more capital and technology intensive sectors, providing room for new countries, both 
still have hundreds of millions of workers, largely in the rural sector, who remain poor 
and will keep a lid on the real wage faced by industrialists over the next decades, 
implying a continuing supply of low cost products in many sectors.  While in principle 
poorer nations can find a niche in which they have a comparative advantage, finding 
them is likely to require a vector of skills  that are best nurtured by membership in a   44
production network or direct interaction with large retailers. 
Designing a proactive system to foster industrial growth was difficult at a simpler 
time when countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan could rely on comparative 
advantage to enable them to successfully enter the world market.  Four decades later in a 
world of international production networks, very fast innovation with dramatic declines 
in product prices, rapidly changing product characteristics, new products that quickly 
lead to the obsolescence of older ones (flat panel computer monitors vs. CRTs), and the 
premium on the ability to rapidly communicate electronically, it may be beyond the 
competence of any government to help their domestic firms foresee and successfully deal 
with more  than a small fraction of the unknowable changes that will affect their future 
trajectory. 
Viewed from the perspective of potential government policies, the growing 
importance of production networks suggests an array of potential interventions.  Korea 
and Taiwan (China) had numerous trading companies that aggregated orders of local 
manufacturers, following the Japanese model of the shosha soga. Most of these arose 
spontaneously from private efforts. Governments could attempt to encourage the 
development of trading companies as there may be a market failure given the 
characteristic that setup costs for such a firm may be significant but marginal costs of 
adding firms to the network may be small. Such trading firms would operate across 
clusters of manufacturing firms. Again, this assumes that there are capital market failures 
that preclude a nascent trading firm from obtaining finance.  
Other policy issues arise. Will government-sponsored clusters be as effective in 
generating sustained improvements in product development, quality upgrading, and 
growing efficiency in order to continue to compete on the world market or will firms 
within clusters improve faster by becoming part of networks? There is some anecdotal 
evidence that international networks attempt to limit the extent of upgrading, especially 
in higher value added segments of design. If this is so, one is back to a situation of 
deciding whether to promote specific activities within the entire production nexus but this 
is surely beyond the capacity of all but the most competent of governments.
41 Taiwan’s 
experience in the Hsinchu Science Park may be provide a counter-example, so far 
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unconfirmed by systematic evidence. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Does the current policy landscape of the multilateral trading system even permit 
developing countries to pursue industrial policy? Should it? It is clear that developing 
countries today have to contend with several multilateral agreements that the rich 
countries did not have to consider when they themselves were developing. Have the 
constraints and disciplines imposed by WTO agreements such as TRIPS and the TRIMS 
become too restrictive to allow developing countries to chart their preferred course to 
economic development? This is a difficult question but it cannot be dismissed out of 
hand. Certainly the international policy environment today imposes constraints on the use 
of national policies that were absent even 15 years ago and the constraints are backed up 
by the potent dispute settlement procedure of the WTO.
42  
The experience in a number of countries in the last two decades suggests that 
private firms often have  been successful at the kind of learning strategies that Succar and 
earlier analysts were advocating as the government’s role. The growth of the Indian 
software sector, Bangladesh’s clothing industry, and China’s special economic zones was 
driven primarily by private sector agents (often from abroad).  In the first two the main 
role of the government was benign neglect while in the latter the Chinese imitated the 
earlier success of Singapore by enabling the location of foreign investment in enclaves 
that were well provided with infrastructure. Much of the earlier investment came from 
overseas Chinese.  
There was not a search in any of these cases that identified firms or industries 
with high learning potential and likely spillovers. In Bangladesh and China the firms 
brought standard technology but importantly extensive marketing networks. Standard 
comparative advantage can explain the pattern of sector choice. Compared with the 
exceptionally complex process of either picking sectors (or firms) or the process of 
allowing firms to identify their own competitive advantage, it seems much more efficient 
in the current state of intensifying world competition and the growing importance of 
extensive and complex supply networks to allow foreign firms to facilitate the reduction   46
of costs in the host economy. This would suggest a change in focus from even the new 
industrial policy to one that focused on negotiation with MNCs on issues ranging from 
environmental regulation and taxes to efforts to ensuring local learning. The difficulty 
with this approach is the limited amount of FDI going to LDCs – many countries in 
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America continue to receive very little. This may be 
due to their overall economic prospects given their policies. But in these economies 
hewing to some of the major tenets of the Washington Consensus while recognizing 
some of its weaknesses might prove a better investment of limited government 
competence and legitimacy than the extraordinarily complex strategies required by  either 
the new or old industrial policy. 
In addition, there exist several working groups that are charged with examining 
the case for multilateral rules on the `Singapore’ issues. What will be the eventual impact 
of these working groups is difficult to say but it is clear that the mere existence of such 
groups is a reflection of the strong undercurrents that are at play in the world trading 
system.  
                                                                                                                                                 
42 For further discussion see Noland and Pack, 2003, Chapter 5.   47
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